Features
Components
Physical hardware devices facilitate numerous capabilities in addition to base usage of the 0KNetwork.
dAppStore
Decentralized App Store for easy access and management of different applications that are native to, and compatible with, the 0KN's decentralized mixnets and private application layer.
Transparent "Smart" Proxy
Auto-route data to different mix networks and network segments according to rules as not all traffic requires the same level of network characteristics including privacy.
Secure Distribution Pipeline
Merkle Tree root hashed software distributions. Nodes only run authenticated-trusted wares. DAØ governs authorized publishers (Merkle Tree contents for private verification) of software, firmware, and hardware -- the full stack of manufacturing and distribution to guarantee secure trusted execution within decentralized context.
Private Authenticity
Using ZKProofs, hardware-based crypto-key storage, and a DAØ-governed manufacturing supply chain, physical devices may prove their authenticity and other characteristics without revealing any information specific to the device or its operator(s). This facilitates a number of features within the 0KNetwork including but not limited to:
- incentive rewards
- anti-counterfeit measures
- decentralized manufacturing
- private access to authorized resources
Figure 1: Merkle Map Key hashed data format for ZK Proofs.
Figure 2: Merkle Tree as a collection of Unique Device Identifiers
R&D Outline
- as managed by the DAO, multi-sig collective process for managing MT
- to bridge the centralized nature of physical product manufacturing with decentralized essence of 0KNetwork
- a MerkleMap shall be maintained as a mapping of authorized mfrs to their
mfr'd node units
- recursively maintained MM of UUIDs to Merkle Tree Root for distributor
- each distributor maintains their own Merkle Tree
- that contains official hardware-based serial numbers
- corresponding to individual node units
- in this manner, a physical node (and thus owner and corresponding wallet
holder)
- can zk-prove ownership of an authentic (non-counterfeit) device
- without revealing
- which mfr
- which device specifically
- without revealing
- mfrs can zk-prove
- device of their creation is online and in commission
- can zk-prove ownership of an authentic (non-counterfeit) device
- consider: way to reveal particular hw id if bad actor, zk-blacklist
- as combined with hw-based tamper-resistance, it can be zk-proven that a node's
physical perimeter has not been compromised
- if also able to access "id" of OS/warez, then zkp of trusted exe env?
- potential issues:
- like mining, mfrs running the nodes themselves?
- check for unique IP addresses
- incentive for unique node on unique IP address
- like mining, mfrs running the nodes themselves?
- extend concept to:
- mix-net powered IoT/DePIN devices
- special: privacy & security
- supply chain security
- mix-net powered IoT/DePIN devices